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Resumen: Este trabajo investiga la relación teórica que existe entre las políticas 
óptimas de comercio y medio ambiente, y sus efectos sobre el bienes-
tar de una economía pequeña, contaminada y abierta, que enfrenta 
distorsiones comerciales y externalidades en la producción. La con-
taminación afecta a los consumidores, pero no la productividad de las 
unidades de producción vecinas, y se genera por el propio proceso de 
producción a través del uso industrial de un insumo intermedio. El bien 
final no numerario y el insumo intermedio son producidos con una tec-
nología que exhibe rendimientos constantes a escala, donde los factores 
primarios de producción son considerados como no comercializables y 
son ofrecidos inelásticamente. En este marco teórico se consideran tres 
instrumentos: un arancel a un bien final, un impuesto a la contamina-
ción y un arancel a las importaciones del insumo intermedio que genera 
contaminación. 
Abstract: Using a pollution-trade general equilibrium model I investigate the 
theoretical relationship between trade and environmental policies and 
their welfare effects in a perfectly competitive small open economy, fac-
ing trade and pollution distortions. Pollution does harm consumers but 
does not affect the productivity of neighboring firms and is generated 
as a by-product of the production process through the industrial use 
of a pure intermediate input. The final tradable good and the interme-
diate input are produced with a constant returns to scale technology 
where non-tradable primary factors of production are offered inelas-
tically. In this framework there are three instruments considered: a 
tariff on a final good, a pollution tax and a tariff on the imports of the 
pollution-creating intermediate input. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT 47) policy-makers have had to understand and explain 
the linkages between trade and environmental policies and their ef-
fects on the environment, trade and welfare of open economies due to 
further world trade liberalisations. 
While environmentalists maintain that free trade may harm the 
environment and could adversely affect welfare, free traders argue 
that freer trade is likely to improve them. The former are partic-
ularly concerned about free trade's long-term effects upon the use 
of environmental resources, arguing that further trade liberalisation 
will eventually expand the extent of the preexisting externalities and 
the market failures that create them. Thus their main concern lies 
in the fact that long-term losses due to the depletion of natural re-
sources could offset the short-term welfare gains, resulting in the non-
sustainability of the liberalisation policy, unless appropriate environ-
mental and trade policies are designed and put in place. 
This paper is concerned with the theoretical relationship between 
trade and environmental policies and their effects on welfare in a 
polluted small open economy. Unlike Turunen-Red and Woodland 
(1999), however, I propose a number of comparative static exercises 
to determine the optimal trade and environmental policies under dif-
ferent second-best scenarios, rather than proposing piecemeal trade 
and environmental reforms in a multilateral setting. I study the nexus 
between trade and environmental policies and how direct and indirect 
effects of changes in trade and environmental taxes affect domestic 
welfare. 
Most of the literature
1 has focused on two particular issues: the 
way pollution is modelled, and how to correct production external-
ities in open economies with second-best trade policies. Copeland 
and Taylor (2001) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2001) propose 
a standard framework to assess trade liberalisations under the scale, 
composition and technique effects of trade on the environment. In 
Copeland (1994) and Copeland and Taylor (2003), local pollution is 
modelled as a by-product of the production process and an emissions 
tax is imposed by the government. Copeland (1994) carried out a 
number of comparative static cases where direct and indirect (spill 
over) effects of trade policies on the environment are considered. He 
1 See Baumol and Oates (1988), Cropper and Oates (1992) among others for 
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concludes that piecemeal trade and environmental reforms should be 
coordinated. On the other hand, he provides a number of cases where 
the use of quotas, as a control for pollution emissions, does not pro-
vide a possible second best justification for trade restrictions on the 
production of the remainder of the productive sectors.
2 
The current paper also addresses the relationship between trade 
and endogenous pollution levels. However, the main focus is quite 
different from the previous literature. It departs from the standard 
approach in the sense that, although pollution is similarly generated 
as a by-product of the production process, it occurs through the use of 
an intermediate pollutant input.
3 In so doing, this paper emphasises 
explicitly the incorporation of an intermediate input which can or 
cannot be produced domestically. Special attention is given to the 
treatment of an intermediate input in the context of the dual approach 
and the concepts of net and gross output revenue. This theoretical 
departure seems to be more realistic in the sense that potentially 
every final good can be thought of as an intermediate input and its 
consumption can generate any kind of pollution. 
On the other hand, the model incorporates the issue of pollution 
intensiveness in the final goods' production. With that fundamen-
tal change, I provide a justification for the policy-maker to use trade 
policy instruments to deal, in a second best fashion, with production 
externalities.
4 The perfectly competitive small open economy faces 
exogenous international prices and has three policy instruments avail-
able, a per-unit tax on the non-numeraire good, a per-unit tax on the 
intermediate input and a pollution tax. Firms in the two relevant 
sectors of the economy are profit maximisers and the non-numeraire 
sector uses the intermediate input intensively, so it can be considered 
as the pollutant. The main feature of the model adds realism to the 
results obtained from the comparative statics carried out, because 
through trade policy, spillover effects actually reduce or exacerbate 
2 See Corden and Falvey (1985). 
3 Pollution generated in this way can be interpreted as being produced through 
industrial consumption, rather than by the production process itself. 
4 This wav of modelling pollution avoids the comnlexitv that arises when nol 
lution is modelled as a result of the production process like in the ioint-oroduction 
approach. Additionally, it provides the same framework as in the Heckscher Ohlin 
model where factors are materialised in final goods, so that we can think of ex-
ports as beine exports of factors of production It also provides us a mechanism 
where via prices direct and indirect effects of trade and environmental policies 
influence the reallocation of resources when prices of final floods fro up or down 
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the negative effects of the use of the intermediate input. In that sense, 
the results presented in this model can be considered as an argument 
that justifies including some environmental standards in trade nego-
tiations. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the theoret-
ical aspects of the model are thoroughly explained. I will develop 
the production and consumption sides with a number of theoretical 
concepts that will allow us to examine the effects of marginal changes 
in a distorted equilibrium. The perfectly competitive framework and 
the dual approach will simplify this analysis. In section 3, the case of 
a small open economy is treated and several comparative static ex-
ercises are performed in order to find the optimal environmental and 
trade policies under different second-best settings. Finally, in section 
4 some conclusions are outlined. 
2. The Model 
I start by considering a standard model of a perfectly competitive 
small open economy that faces fixed world prices. Two final goods 
are produced by two subsectors which differ in the intensity of the use 
of the intermediate input which is produced by a third sector, and 
tradeable in the international market, as the final goods. 
Pollution is generated as a by product of the production pro-
cess. The first final good is the numeraire so that its price will, as 
is usual, be considered as Pl = 1; the second final good will be the 
non-numeraire, so that its price p2 will be the relative price of the non-
numeraire good in terms of the numeraire, and the third product, an 
intermediate input, will have its price q in terms of the numeraire as 
well. I will suppose the intermediate input is a nitrogenous fertiliser. 
The economy is assumed to be endowed with three primary 
factors of production which are offered inelastically and are non-
tradeable in international markets, namely: labour, capital and urea. 
The economy has three industries, each one producing only one prod-
uct. Sector one and two produce the numeraire and non-numeraire 
respectively, with two of the following primary factors each: capital, 
labour and fertiliser as intermediate inputs. Sector three produces the 
intermediate input with three primary factors of production: capital, 
labour and urea. 
To keep things simple, I have assumed that pollution does harm 
consumers but does not affect productivity in neighbouring firms. On 
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not considered.
5 The two final goods and the intermediate input are 
produced with a constant returns to scale technology. The proposed 
model is a standard one of a perfectly competitive small open economy 
with trade and pollution taxes: t and r, as trade instruments and s 
playing a role as a pollution tax.
6 
To characterise the production side of this small open economy 
I will use the gross GDP or revenue function:
7 
R (P, q + a, V) = max {pg | (x, V) e T\.
8 By the envelope the-
{g,g
F} 
orem (Hotelling's Lemma): Rp = g is the gross supply of the non-
5 Copeland and Taylor (1995) consider a model where pollution is generated 
in the consumption sector. 
6 Unlike Copeland (1994), where the model explicitly incorporates a vector 
of pollutants generated by the production process, in this model there is not a 
function that relates the amount of product to the amount of pollution generated. 
Instead it is assumed to be produced by the use (industrial consumption) of the 
intermediate input. 
7 The main differences in a context of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework are 
firstly, that the introduction of an intermediate input makes necessary the intro-
duction of the gross and net output concepts, both at an industry level, and at a 
sectorial level. The latter is the relevant variable for the purposes of this model. 
The net (sector) product is defined as the gross product of commodity j minus 
the input of commodity j used in all industries (including the one that produces 
that commodity). If as a result of the above calculation the net product is zero, 
it means that commodity j has been produced only to serve as an input in the 
production of other final goods. 
Secondly, considering that the intermediate input is produced with the same 
primary factors as the final goods, it is necessary to make further assumptions 
regarding the dimension of the model. Accordingly, in the traditional two by 
two case (two factors-two products), the introduction of the intermediate input 
carries out several other theoretical implications. Batra and Casas (1973), pointed 
out that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem depends on the validity of the Stolper-
Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems. However, when three goods are produced, 
the pattern of trade turns out to be indeterminate. 
To solve this, either the intermediate input or one of the final goods should be 
considered as non-tradeable. Alternatively, another solution would be to consider 
that world prices are such that the production of one of the goods is unprofitable. 
In such a case, we would have the classical two by two case again, but the solution 
would be unattractive. So, this model preserves the attraction of the two-by-two 
case in its n-by-n generalization in the sense that the definition of factor intensity 
involves only the technology and not the factor endowments. The uniqueness of 
the determination of the factor market prices by the goods' prices holds in this 
three-by-three model (factor price equalisation theorem). 
8 The revenue function is convex in prices and concave in factor endowments, 208 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
numeraire product; RQ = g
F is the gross supply of the intermediate 
input; RV = w is the vector of primary factor prices, and RF = q + s 
is the industrial consumer's price of fertiliser. 
Because the revenue function is convex in prices, output sup-
plies are upward-sloping, then: RPP > 0 and RQQ > 0. On the other 
hand, the sign of the fertiliser's cross price effect on the non-numeraire 
good's supply, i.e., RPQ < 0, whether the non-numeraire good uses in-
tensively the intermediate input (RPQ < 0), or not (RPQ = 0).
9 
Being concave in the factor market prices the second derivatives 
of the revenue function are: RVV < 0 and ^ = RFF < 0,
1
0 i.e., 
the inverse demands for all factors are downward-sloping. On the 
other hand, the Rybczynski coefficients are: R^ = RVP, and RPF = 
RFP > or < 0, depending on whether the non-numeraire good 
uses the intermediate input intensively (RPF > 0), or not {RPF < 0), 
respectively. 
The demand side will be modelled using the dual of the indi-
rect utility function. The expenditure function will now include the 
amount of fertiliser used by the agricultural sector. It emerges from 





Application of the envelope theorem (Shephard's lemma) leads 
and linearly homogeneous in each set of parameters. 
9 An alternative way to look at it is that if the intermediate input is used 
intensively in the production of the non-numeraire good, an exogenous increase 
in the price of the non-numeraire good, p2, would cause an increase in the pro-
duction of this final good, consequently, that would increase the demand for the 
intermediate input. However, due to the reallocation of productive resources, the 
excess demand for the intermediate input would put pressure on the industrial's 
consumer price, therefore increasing (g+s) and then decreasing the production of 
the final non-numeraire good. By Young's theorem Rpq=Rqp<0. 
1
0 According to the concavity of the revenue function. It answers the question 
about how the producer's price of fertiliser changes when the supply of fertiliser 
changes. 
1
1 The utility function is additively separable in goods and pollution, i.e., 
£/(c,F)=0(c)+v(F), since pollution adversely affects consumers' utility we have 
<p'(F)<0. Besides, in the utility function, consumption of goods is a choice vari-
able for the consumer, but pollution generated through the industrial consump-
tion of fertiliser F is not controlled by the representative consumer. Equivalently, 
consumer preferences may be represented by the expenditure function E(p,U,F) 
which is concave in p, and increasing in U and F. An increase in the level of 
F is assumed to harm consumers, so that the minimum cost of attaining a given 
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us to get: Ep the Hicksian demand function, Ev the reciprocal of the 
marginal utility of income, and EF the marginal damage. Moreover, 
due to the concavity of the expenditure function on p, the second 
derivatives of the expenditure function are Epp < 0, which is the 
slope of the compensated demand function.
1
2 Likewise, EpU > 0 with 
prices given, the increase in utility leads to an increase in the level of 
consumption. Furthermore, EpF > 0 so that the increase in the level 




The equilibrium for this economy will be represented by the following 
trade expenditure functions for the domestic and foreign countries, 
respectively, and the market clearing conditions on the non-numeraire 
and the intermediate inputs: 
E(l,p + t,U,F) = R(l,p + t,q + T,V,F)-RFF + sF + tm+Tm
F (1) 
E* (l,p, U*, F*) = R* (l,p, q, V*, F*) - R*FF (2) 
m + m* + 0 (3) 
m
F + m
FV 0 (4) 
In general from equations (1) to (4) it is necessary to determine 
four unknowns, i.e., two relative prices p and q, and two utility levels 
U and U* with four equations. Where: 
m
F = F - Rq (5) 
m = Ep - Rp (6) 
RF = q + s + T (7) 
L
Z For normal goods the substitution effect will be negative. 
1
3 To preserve the same level of utility it is necessary to compensate by increas-
ing the amount of the non-numeraire good. However, if compensation is derived 
from the numeraire good, this derivative is equal to zero. 210 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
p
d = p + t (8) 
q
d = q + T (9) 
are the imports of the intermediate input (5), the imports of the 
non-numeraire good (6), the industrial consumer price of the inter-
mediate input (7), the one to one relationship between domestic and 
international prices of the non-numeraire good (8), and the one to 
one relationship between the domestic and international prices of the 
intermediate input (9). Moreover, F is the amount of fertiliser used 
as an intermediate input by the final goods' sector, t is a trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good, r is a trade tax on the intermediate input, 
and s is a tax on the use of the intermediate input. Equations (1) 
and (2) represent the general equilibrium trade expenditure functions 
for the representative consumer in the domestic and foreign countries, 
whereas equations (3) and (4) capture the market clearing conditions 
for the non-numeraire and intermediate inputs respectively.
1
4 
As usual, the representative consumer spends all his income (Wal 
ras'law): in order to achieve the level U of utility, the representative 
consumer will spend as much as the gross revenue less the value of 
the gross intermediate product, plus the revenue collected by the gov-
ernment in the form of a tax on the use of the intermediate input, 
a trade tax on the imports of the non-numeraire and a trade tax on 
the imports of the intermediate input. One key assumption made 
here is that the revenue collected by the government is distributed to 
the representative agents by mean of lump-sum transfers. The same 
reasoning would apply to the foreign country. 
3. Welfare Effects and Optimal Policies 
The model presented involves a small open economy where the foreign 
country has no active role in the channels by which the domestic wel-
fare is affected.
1
5 The methodology consists in totally differentiating 
1
4 Notice that equation (2) does not involve the use of trade and environmen-
tal instruments for the foreign country. Besides, equations (3) and (4) held with 
equality mean that both, domestic and foreign countries, determine international 
prices for all tradeable commodities. By Walras' law, the market clearing condi-
tion for the numeraire good does hold. 
1
5 Implicitly, the rest of the world is playing a role in the determination of inter-
national prices and therefore, in the fulfillment of the market clearing conditions 
for the intermediate and the non-numeraire good. OPTIMAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 211 
the trade expenditure and the market clearing conditions, to establish 
how the equilibrium can be marginally changed, and how that change 
affects domestic welfare in order to further examine which channels 
of transmission are acting. 
Totally differentiating (1) and using (5) to (9), taking into ac-
count that from (8) and (9) dp = dt and dq = dr, I get an expression 
that measures the welfare as a function of the targets: consumption 
of the intermediate input and imports of the non-numeraire good and 
intermediate input, rather than the policy instruments: 
EvdU = {s- EF)dF + Tdm
F + tdm (10) 
As is known, Ev > 0 is the inverse of the marginal utility of 
income, thus EvdU measures the change in welfare of the represen-
tative consumer and has, according to (10), three components: the 
change in the consumption of the intermediate input (dF), the effect 
of the trade distortion on the intermediate input (dm
F) , and the 
effect of the trade distortion on the non-numeraire good (dm) .
i
e 
Totally differentiating (5), (6) and (7) to get an expression that 
measures the change in welfare in terms of the changes in the instru-
ments, i.e., the pollution tax and the trade taxes, rather than the 
targets as in eq. (10), we have, 
EudU(l-tCy) = -aAds-[t(Rpp - Epp)+TRqp - aRFpA]dt (11) 
- [tRpg + rRgg + a(l - RFg)A] dr 
Equation (11) combines the direct and indirect effects of marginal 
changes in the policy instruments on domestic welfare. From (7), (8) 
and (9) marginal changes in the policy instruments directly affect 
commodities' prices. These potential marginal changes in domestic 
prices affect the allocation of productive resources among the three 
different sectors and then on the levels of industrial production, which 
in turn affects the demand for the intermediate input and then the 
pollution emissions' level. 
As pointed out by Copeland (1994) in the presence of trade taxes 
(i and r), an increase in pollution has a direct effect on consumers EF 
and indirect effects on trade distortions represented with the term 
-r(l - RgF) - t(EpF - RpF). 
i
b The trade distortions are the import tariffs on the non-numeraire good and 
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Then, the A term in equation (11), 
A = [EF — s — T(1 — RqF) - t{EpF - RpF)\ 
represents the measure of the marginal external damage to consumers 
from pollution (involving direct and indirect effects) and the pollution 
tax 8 that compensates the externality. 
Accordingly, the term ads represents the direct effect of the 
change in the tax s on the use of intermediate input F. Similarly, 
the term t (i?pp - Epp) dt captures the direct effect of the change in 
the trade tax on the net output of the traded non-numeraire good. On 
the other hand, rRqqdT represents the direct effect of the change in 
the trade tax on the intermediate input, on the net output of traded 
intermediate input. Similarly, the terms rRqpdt and tRpqdr captures 
cross effects of marginal changes in trade distortions. 
Additionally, the indirect effects of marginal changes in the trade 
distortions on the demand for the intermediate input (pollution) are 
represented by the terms: -aRFpdt for the non-numeraire and, q(1 -
RFq)dr for the intermediate sectors, respectively. Likewise, the term 
(1 - tCy) > 0 is known as the tariff multiplier and is assumed to be 
positive for normal goods.
1
7 To find the optimal policies, I will show 
the next subcases by means of some comparative statics. 
3.1. First Best Cases: One Policy Instrument, One Distortion 
I consider three first best cases where the policy maker or a central 
planner has just one instrument available to deal with one distortion 
at a time. I present three sub-cases depending on the type of policy 
instrument available. Case A shows the optimal level of the pollution 
tax when trade taxes are at their free trade levels. Cases B and C 
show the optimal trade taxes for the non-numeraire and the interme-
diate, respectively, taking into account that the pollution tax is at its 
optimal level and unalterable. 
3.1.1. Case A 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the pollution 
tax. Trade taxes corresponding with the non-numeraire good and 
L
i The tariff multiplier is known as the Hatta condition and its derivation is 
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intermediate input are at their free trade level, i.e., t = r = 0, which 
implies dt = dr = 0. 
Equation (11) becomes: 
EudU(l-tCy) = -a[EF-s}ds (12) 
Equation (12) measures the change in domestic welfare that de-
pends on the difference between the marginal damage EF and the pol-
lution tax a, and the direction of the marginal change in the pollution 
tax (ds). If the pollution tax increases (ds > 0), it has two effects on 
domestic welfare, depending on the difference between the marginal 
damage and the level of the pollution tax. If the marginal damage 
is greater (lower) than the pollution tax, i.e., EF > s (EF < s), an 




From (12) we can get the first order condition that maximises 
domestic welfare to find the optimal pollution tax: 
_ = 0 =» s* = EF (13) 
ds 
The optimal pollution tax is defined by (13) and exactly equal 
to the marginal damage. It is best known as the Pigouvian tax. 
Intuitively, the optimal Pigouvian tax results when trade taxes are at 
their optimal free trade level. This guarantees the relation between 
the production externality and the level of the pollution tax. 
3.1.2. Case B 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good. Trade tax corresponding to the intermediate 
input is at its free trade level, i.e., T = 0, which implies dr = 0, while 
the pollution tax is at the Pigouvian level but unalterable, therefore 
ds = 0. 
Equation (11) becomes: 
EvdU(l - tCy) = -t [(Rpp - Epp) + aRFp(EpF - RpF)j dt (14) 
1
8 If we had a pollution tax reform, the direction of such a reform would be 
dependant on the difference between EF and the level of the pollution tax s. 214 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
From (14) we can determine the optimal trade tax that max-
imises the welfare of the small open economy. The first order condi-
tion is then the following: 
— = 0=M' = 0 (15) 
The optimal trade tax on the non-numeraire is defined by (15) , 
and corresponds with its free trade level.
1
9 
3.1.3. Case C 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax 
on the intermediate input. Trade tax corresponding with the non-
numeraire good is at its free trade level, i.e., t = 0, which implies dt = 
0, while the pollution tax is at the Pigouvian level but unalterable, 
therefore ds = 0. In this case (11) becomes: 
EudUil - tCy) = -T [Rgg - «(l - RFg)(l ~ RqF)] d.T (16) 
From (16) we can find the optimal trade tax such that maximises 
the small open economy's welfare with the first order condition: 
— = 0=>T*=0 (17) 
dr
 v ; 
The optimal trade tax on the intermediate input is defined by 
(17), and corresponds with its free trade level.
2
0 
3.2. Second Best Cases: One Policy Instrument, Two Distortions 
I consider two sub-cases depending on the type of policy instrument 
available. In case D, I am assuming that the pre-existent policy-
induced distortion through the trade tax on the intermediate input 
1
9 This means that when the trade tax on the intermediate input is at its free 
trade level, i.e., r*=0, and the pollution tax is the Pigouvian tax, i.e., s"=EF 
(unalterable), the first best optimal trade tax on the non-numeraire good is the 
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is not present because the it is at its optimal level r* = 0. Further-
more, I assume that the pollution tax is at a suboptimal level (a = 0), 
although the production externality is still present. 
3.2.1. Case D 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good, r = a = 0 which implies dr = ds = 0. 
Then (11) becomes: 
EudU{l-tCv)= (18) 
-{t(Rpp - Epp) - aRFp[EF - t{EpF - RpF)])dt 
Equation (18) measures the change in welfare only in terms of the 
change in the trade tax. It can be seen that (18) has a mix of direct 
and indirect effects that affect its sign. For instance, an increase in 
the trade tax on the non-numeraire good (dt > 0) has two effects: 
the direct effect -t(Rpp - Epp)dt that measures the difference of two 
pure substitution effects, and the indirect effect of the change in the 
trade tax, via the price of the non-numeraire, on the demand for the 
intermediate good, i.e., —aRFp [EF - t(EpF - RpF)} dt.
2
1 
The optimal trade tax comes from the first order condition: 
^ = 0 => 
'* = TP, TP , o /F r>—vT^
F (
19) 
[Rpp - Epp + aRFp{EpF - RpF)\ 
To determine the sign of the optimal trade tax in (19), assume 
the non-numeraire sector is using the intermediate input intensively, 
i.e., RpF > 0.
2
2 Besides, suppose that compensation to consumers 
comes from the numeraire good, i.e., EpF = 0.
2
3 In such a case, the 
2
1 If we had a trade reform, the sign of the indirect effect would be crucial to 
determine the total welfare effect if <ii<0. 
RpF<0. 
2
3 If compensation comes from the non-numeraire good EpF>0. Turunen-Red 
consumer s utility we Know ip ;<u. ims implies tnat hipF— 0. 216 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
optimal trade tax given by (19) would be a negative one, i.e., t* < 0, 
which means that it would correspond to a subsidy on the imports of 
the non-numeraire good. 
The intuition is that in the absence of a pollution tax correct-
ing the production externality (s = 0), a small open economy trading 
with the rest of the world and acting as a price taker will subsidise its 
imports of the non-numeraire good,
2
4 aiming to displace the domestic 
production of the non-numeraire pollutant good, taking into account 
both, the production externality and the trade policy-induced distor-
tion, according to the assumptions made.
2
5 
3.2.2. Case E 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the intermediate input, t = s = 0 which implies dt = ds = 0. 
In this case, the policy maker has neither the trade tax on the 
non-numeraire good, nor the pollution tax. Only the trade tax on the 
intermediate input is available to the policy maker, but the production 
externality is still present. 
Thus the trade balance equation (11) now measures the change 
in welfare in terms of the change in the trade tax on the intermediate 
input: 
EvdU = - [rRqq + a(l - RFq) [EF - T(1 - RqF)}) dr (20) 
Equation (20) measures the change in domestic welfare in terms 
of the marginal change of the trade tax on the intermediate input. 
Its coefficient has, as in the previous case, a mix of direct and in-
direct effects upon welfare transmitted via the price of the inter-
mediate input q. For instance, an increase in the trade tax of the 
intermediate input (dr > 0) has two effects: -rRqqdT as a pure sub-
stitution (direct) effect. The indirect effect is measured by the term 
-a(l - RFq) [EF - r(l - RqF)] dr. The term [EF - r(l - RqF)] is, 
in this case, the relevant measure of the marginal external damage. 
To determine the optimal trade tax on the intermediate input, 
we look for the first order condition of (20): 
2
4 Notice that we are not considering transboundary pollution. 
2
5 From (19) it can be inferred that if the non-numeraire good is not intensive 
in the use of the intermediate input, i.e., RFp<0, the resulting optimal trade tax 
on the non-numeraire good would be positive, i.e., i*>0, and greater than the 
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(!-V)-Ä 
(21) 
Equation (21) is the optimal trade tax that maximises domes-
tic welfare. To find out its sign assume the economy is a net im-
porter of the intermediate input, i.e., m
F > 0, then this implies that 




6 Accordinriv the ODtimum trade tax on 
the intermediate input (21) would be positive, il, T*>0. 
The rationale for this result has to do with the'fact that imposing 
a trade tax on the imports of the intermediate input, would cause its 
price to become greater, decreasing the demand for F and improving 
indirectly the domestic welfare by reducing pollution emissions. 
1 
T 
3.3. First Best Cases: Two Policy Instruments, Two Distortions 
Next, I examine the case in which the policy maker decides on the 
level of the instruments available, now two at a time, with two dis-
tortions present. I consider two sub-cases: each of the trade taxes 
in combination with a pollution tax. In so doing, I consider the re-
mainding trade tax as being at its optimal free trade level. 
3.3.1. Case F 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses both the trade 
tax on the use of the intermediate input and the optimal level of the 
pollution tax. t = 0 which implies dt = 0. 
In this case, the small open economy does not have trade distor-
tions on the non-numeraire good. Equation (11) becomes: 
EudU = -a[EF-s-r(l-RqF)]ds (22) 
- [rRgg + a(l - RFq) [EF - s - T(1 - RqF)}} dr 
M The fact that 0<RqF<l, can be thought of as a consequence of the fact that 
the domestic country is a net importer of the intermediate input, so that if the 
rate at which the supply of fertiliser changes Rq relative to changes in the demand 
for fertiliser RqF, is lower than one, then the domestic country needs to import 
this input, due to the sluggish adjustment of its domestic supply. 218 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
As in the previous cases, from (22) the marginal changes on the 
levels of the pollution tax (da) and the trade tax on the intermediate 
input (dr) do affect the domestic welfare through direct and indirect 
effects. If trade tax r increases (dr > 0), the direct effect is captured 
by -TRgqdT, and corresponds to the effect of the marginal change in 
the trade tax on the supply of the intermediate input. On the other 
hand, the term -a(l - RFQ) [EF-s~ r(l - RGF)} dr measures the 
indirect effect of the change in the trade tax and then on pollution 
generation. Since RQQ > 0, the direct effect of a change in the trade 
tax T on the production of the intermediate input will always be 
positive: the more protection, the higher the level of domestic output 
will be. Conversely, a reduction in the level of protection will decrease 
the level of domestic intermediate input produced.
2
7 
Solving the simultaneous equation system derived from the first 
order conditions: |f = 0 and %\j = 0, from (22): 




1 To determine the sign of the indirect effect we need to define whether the 
home country is a net importer of the intermediate input. In such a case, as 
explained above, the sign of the expression (l-RqF), would be positive, where 
RqF involves the indirect effect of the change in the trade tax on the demand for 
the intermediate input and the generation of pollution. Its sign will also depend 
on whether the relevant measure of the marginal damage is positive or negative, 
i.e., the term [EF-s-T(l-RqF)]. 
Further examination of the coefficient premultiplying the marginal change 
in the pollution tax allows us to establish that the total marginal damage to 
consumers is given by the expression a[EF-T(l~RqF)], where the direct effect 
is captured by the marginal damage EF and the indirect effect by r(l-RgF). 
Using a similar setting, Turunen-Red and Woodland (2002) modelled the effects 
of pollution on welfare with an index of environmental damage, which measures 
the environment's quality as a function of the amount of pollution emissions 
considering, abatement activities. This characteristic, leads to a different set 
of policy implications. OPTIMAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 219 
a{l-RFq){s-EF) 
(Rqq - a(l - RFq)(l - RqF))
 [ ' 
Now solving simultaneously the equation system (23) and (24), 
we get: 
a* = EF (25) 
r* = 0 (26) 
Equations (25) and (26) show the first best level of trade and 
pollution taxes. While (25) measures the optimal Pigouvian tax, 
(26) is the free trade level for the tax on the intermediate input. This 
result is consistent with a trade tax on the non-numeraire good being 
at its free trade level, i.e., t* = 0. 
3.3.2. Case G 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good and the optimal level of the pollution tax. 
r = 0, which implies dr = 0. 
In this case the small open economy does not have a trade dis-
tortion on the intermediate input. Equation (11) then becomes: 
EvdU(l - tCv) = -a[EF - a - t(EpF - RpF)} ds (27) 
- [t(Rpp - Epp) - aRFp [EF-s- t(EpF - RpF)]\ dt 
As in the previous case, we need to solve the simultaneous equa-
tion system from the first order conditions, i.e., f-\t = 0 and C|a = 
0, simultaneously. So, from (27): 
3rl* = 0 
OS I 
= EF- t(EpF - RpF)  (28) 
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aRFp [Ep - s) 
((Rpp - Epp) + aRpp(EpF - RpF)) 
Solving simultaneously (28) and (29), we then get: 
s* = EF (30) 
t* = 0 (31) 
If the trade tax on the intermediate good is at its free trade 
level, i.e., r* = 0, the optimal first-best policy for intervention is a 
Pigouvian tax on the use of the intermediate input, i.e., s* = Ep, 
and a trade tax on the non-numeraire good at its free trade level, i.e., 
t* = 0, as (30) and (31) define. Unlike the results shown in Turunen-
Red and Woodland (20 02),
2
8 in this model the optimal trade policy 
is the free trade level for the trade policy instrument while the opti-
mal environmental policy remains the Pigouvian tax. The theoretical 
context is similar to Copeland (1994) in the sense that if pollutants 
that are lightly taxed are generated when highly protected goods are 
produced, then there is a welfare sain if protection is reduced, which 
means that the direct effect of a reduction in the trade tax acts in the 
same direction of the indirect effect of the trade tax on the pollution 




8 Turunen-Red and Woodland (2002), found a dependence between the free 
trade level and the level of the environmental tax, namely, "free trade is optimal 
in our small open economy only when environmental tax distortions have been 
removed or if production activities have no pollution effects". See note no. 10 in 
Turunen-Red and Woodland (2002). 
2
9 Assuming that compensation to the representative consumer comes from 
the numeraire good and that production of the non-numeraire is intensive in the 
use of the intermediate input, (EpF-RpF)<0, then the whole associated indirect 
effect in (27), i.e., aRFp[EF-s-t(EpF-RpF)]dt>0, would be positive, as long as 
we had the optimal Pigouvian tax, i.e., s'=EF. In other words, an increase in the 
level of protection would exacerbate the pollution distortion because production 
of the pollution-intensive non-numeraire good increases at the expense of trade 
protection, therefore generating more pollution. 
Similarly, an increase in the pollution tax would decrease industrial con-
sumption of the intermediate pollutant input, therefore the marginal damage 
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3.4. Second Best Cases: Two Policy Instruments, Three Distortions 
In this subsection I present three subcases where the policy maker 
does have the possibility to change two policy instruments at a time 
in the presence of all distortions. In each of the cases, one of the 
unavailable instruments is supposed to be at a suboptimal level and 
unalterable. 
3.4.1. Case H 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good t and the pollution tax s in the presence of 
all potential distortions, with the trade tax on the intermediate input 
at a suboptimal level and unalterable this implies that dr = 0. 
Equation (11) becomes: 
EudUil-tCy) = -a Ads - (t(Rpp - Epp) + rRgp - aRFpA) dt (32) 
From (32) we solve two first order conditions that generate a 
system of simultaneous equations: 
W 1^ = 0 
aRFp (EF - s) - r [Rqp + aRFp(l - RgF)} 
and 
dU 
[(Rpp - Epp) + aRFp(EpF - RpF)] 
\t,f = 0 
s = EF — T(1 — RqF) - t{EpF - RpF) (34) 
Solving the system (33) and (34) we have: 
as t(EpF-RpF)ds, which in combination with the difference between the pollu-
tion tax and the marginal damage, gives us the total effect of the change in the 
pollution emissions tax on the reduction in the use of the intermediate input and 
the related effect on the utility and the production of the intermediate input. 222 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
and 





ÍRqp{EpF RpF) (Rpp E„)(l RgF)\ (36) 
V {Rpp EppJ ) 
Looking at (35) and (36) ,it is clear that the sign of the optimal 
trade tax on the non-numeraire good depends on the sign of the trade 
tax T imposed to the intermediate input, provided that the following 
factor is positive: 
i > 0 
Rpp -Epp 
as it is, by the assumptions made. Thus, the sign of the optimal trade 
instrument will be positive or negative, i.e., t* > or < 0, as long as 
the suboptimal tax on the intermediate input is positive or negative 
as well, i.e., T > or < 0. 
Analogously, the optimal pollution tax would be positive, nega-
tive or equal to the marginal damage, i.e., s*^EF, depending on the 
sign of the term Rnn(E„F - RnF)-(Rr^, - En„)(l - R„F), and the 
sien of the oreexistent trade tax onthe intermediate inout e r^O 
The relevantTof^tSs result is LnreciatTcSarlv if we comoare the 
second S?DLTDSton t« fo>m (36) to the first best optimal 
one that comes from (30). 
In this second best scenario the potential policy-induced distor-
tion caused by a suboptimal r is partially compensated by the second-
best optimal pollution tax a*, and the second best optimal trade tax 
t* . While the first best scenario brought about an optimal pollution 
tax equal to the marginal damage, in this second best case, the opti-
mal pollution tax is either higher or lower than the marginal damage, 
as it was expected. In fact, if the marginal damage is not too high, 





0 This possibility could arise if the production of the non-numerarie good was 
not intensive on the use of the intermediate input, i.e., RpF<0. In that case 
the sign of the second element of the optimal pollution tax would be positive or 
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3.4.2. Case I 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax 
on the intermediate input r and the pollution tax a in the presence 
of all potential distortions, with the trade tax on the non-numeraire 
good at a suboptimal level and unalterable, this implies dt = 0. 
From (11) we have the equation that measures the change in 
welfare depending on the adjustments in the policy instruments: 
ErjdU(l - tCy) = -aAda - [tRPg + rRqg + a(l - RFq)A] dr (37) 
Solving the system of simultaneous equations coming from the 
first order conditions we have: 




s = EF-r{\- RqF) - t(EpF - RpF) (39) 






T^nqp(FpF- VHHg-*„)dj > Qr <0; M lQng M T < Qr >Q^ Con. 
sidering the case in which T>0, RpF<0 and assuming that the marginal damage 








R9FA=i.s*<0 i.e., a subsidy to the 
I (ttpp —C/pp) } 
use of the intermediate input. The rationale behind this result is that if the non-
numeraire sector is not pollution intensive and the suboptimal trade tax on the 
intermediate input is positive, for the domestic policy-maker the spillover effect 
may come from the unalterable trade tax on the intermediate product, rather 
than from the pollution intensiveness by itself. 224 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
s* = EF + t 
Rpg(l - RqF) - RqqjEpF - Rpp 
(41) 
Rqq J 
Equations (40) and (41) are the second-best optimal policies. 
Both compensate the policy induced distortion caused by the trade 
tax on the non-numeraire good being at a suboptimal level, and 
the production externality. From (40) the sign of the optimal trade 
tax r*depends on the sign of the pre-existent trade tax on the non-
numeraire good t because (- ^ j > 0, on the assumptions about 
pollution intensiveness, and on the pattern of trade on the interme-
diate input. This means that r*|0 <=> r|0 
From (41) we can argue that the sign of the optimal pollution tax 
will depend on the sign of two components: Rpq(l-RqF)-Rqq(Epp-
RpF) and t. Under the assumption of pollution intensiveness for the 
non-numeraire good and a small open economy being a net importer 
of the intermediate input, the first element has a positive sign. If the 
trade tax is positive as well, from (40) it can be seen that the second 
best optimal pollution tax would be higher than the marginal damage, 
i.e., s* > EF. The clear implication is that when a pollution-intensive 
non-numeraire sector is protected by a tariff (t > 0), then domestic 
welfare can only be compensated with a tariff on the use of the inter-
mediate input, i.e., T* > 0, and with a pollution tax strictly higher 
than the optimal one, i.e., s* > Ep. The result is understandable 
if we consider that a protected pollution-intensive sector has to be 
regulated by a pollution tax designed to lessen the excess of pollution 
generated. 
3.4.3. Case J 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax 
on the non-numeraire good t and the trade tax on the intermediate 
input T in the presence of all potential distortions, with the pollution 
tax at a suboptimal level and unalterable, this implies ds = 0. 
Equation (11) then becomes: 
EvdU(l - tCv) = - (t(Rpp - EpP) + rRqp - aRppA) dt (42) 
- (tRpq + rRqq + a(l - RFq)A) dr 
From (42) we need to solve two first order conditions having as 
a result a simultaneous equation system: ff|a,f = 0 OPTIMAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 225 
aRFp (EF -S)-T [Rgp + aRFp{l - RgF)] 
[(Rpp - Epp) + aRFp(EpF - RpF)] 
(43) 
<§\s,t = 0 
t  — 
-{a(\-RFq)(EF-s)+t[Rpq-a(l-RFq)(EpF-RpF)]} 
T ~ [Rqq-a(l~RFq)(l-RqF)}  (44) 
Solving the system we have: 
fJP ,iRFPRqq + RqP(l-RFg) 
t = a {EF — s) < —^ — 
I i Li 
(45) 
and, 
T* = -a (EF - s) 
(Rpp - Epp)(l - RFq) + RppRpq 
(46) 
where: 
fl = [Rpp - Epp) [Rqq - a(l - RFq)(l - RqF)] 
qF) 
+a(EpF - RpF) [RFpRgg + (1 - RFg)Rpq\ 
-Rgp [RPq + a(l - RFq)RpF)] 
Equations (45) and (46) are the second-best optimal trade taxes 
for the intermediate input and the non-numeraire good.
3
1 If we as-
sume that the production of the non-numeraire good is not pollution-
intensive (RpF < 0), but that the home country is still a net importer 
of the intermediate input ([1 - RFq] > 0), factors post multiplying 
the optimal trade taxes would be negative if the following term held 
with strict inequality, a(l - RFq)RpF > Rpq. This means that the 
3
1 The small open economy case is made for optimal trade taxes if we had a 
Pigouvian tax, i.e., s*=EF, then t*=r*=0. However, in this particular case, in 
which the pollution tax is at a sub-optimal level and unalterable, the sign of both 
trade instruments depends on the interaction between the different direct and 
indirect effects of changes in prices of both commodities. 226 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
direct effect of an increase in the amount of intermediate input re-
quired in its own productive sector multiplied by the indirect effect 
of an increase in the amount of intermediate input required in the 
non-numeraire sector (considering the domestic country is a net im-
porter of the intermediate input), must be greater than the effect of 
an increase in the producer's price of intermediate input on the pro-
duction of the non-numeraire good. With this condition the whole 
term in brackets in (45) would be negative, i.e., {•} < 0 and the term 
in brackets in (46) would be positive, i.e., [•] > 0. Therefore, the sign 
of the optimal policy would be determined by the sign of the differ-
ence between the marginal damage and the pollution tax (EF - s). 
In other words, i*|0 if and only if (EF - s) |0. On the other hand, 





The purpose of this paper has been to determine the optimal poli-
cies in a country that faces policy imposed distortions in the form 
of trade taxes on the non-numeraire good, and on the intermediate 
tradeable input. Furthermore it faces a production externality gener-
ated as a by-product of the production process, through the industrial 
consumption of an intermediate pollutant input. 
The main insight comes from the fact that we are modelling 
pollution generation through a mechanism where we assume a certain 
degree of intensity in the use of a pollutant productive factor. Then, 
instead of using a vector of pollutants and calculating the optimal 
amount of pollutions emissions as a function of the vector of pollution 
taxes, as the majority of the trade-pollution models in the literature 
does, we use only one pollutant factor considering that through its 
For instance, if the difference between the marginal damage and the subopti¬
mal pollution tax were positive, the optimal trade policies would be trade taxes for 
both sectors. The rational behind this result is that with a sub-optimal pollution 
tax (EF-a)>0, part of the production externality not covered by the pollution tax 
has to be compensated with the trade policy instruments, being both trade taxes. 
A second-best positive trade tax would protect the non-pollution-intensive non-
numeraire sector from being displaced by pollution-intensive imports, generating 
a positive spillover effect on the environment (if pollution intensiveness is assumed 
in the imports of similar products). By the same token, a protected intermediate 
sector gives as a result a lower consumption of the intermediate pollutant input 
by the industrial consumers, therefore generating less pollution. OPTIMAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 227 
industrial consumption pollution is generated. The more the intensity 
of use of that pollutant factor, the more the amount of pollution 
generated by that sector. Therefore we can differentiate between 
highly pollutant sectors and those with production techniques which 
use non-pollutant productive factors intensively. 
For all first best cases, for the trade tax on the non-numeraire 
good, the pattern of optimal policies does depend on the pollution-
intensiveness. In such a case, the optimal trade tax is positive when 
the non-numeraire sector is not pollution-intensive. Only in that case, 
a tariff protected sector will not exacerbate, through spillover effects, 
the production externalities generated through the use of the interme-
diate pollutant input. The opposite makes sense when a pollution-
intensive non-numeraire sector must have a subsidy on imports in 
order to displace domestic pollutant production with cleaner prod-
ucts from abroad. The spillover effect to the environment would be 
positive. However, the optimal pollution tax and the optimal trade 
tax on the intermediate pollutant input do not depend directly on 
the pollution-intensiveness of the non-numeraire sector, but indirectly 
through the marginal damage EF. In view of these results, if we take 
into account the pollution-intensiveness of the imported goods, we 
have to further consider the degree of pollution-intensiveness of the 
domestic produced good. If both are pollution-intensive, a call for an 
optimal subsidy on the imports of the intermediate input would result 
in a higher pollution tax, offsetting the increase in domestic pollution. 
As a consequence, from the policy-making point of view trade taxes 
should be determined along with pollution taxes to compensate, from 
a first best perspective negative spillover effects that arise from pro-
duction externalities, either in consumption or production. 
Second best cases have an analogous interpretation. Even though 
a pattern of second best cases would be desirable, optimal policies do 
depend on a number of assumptions like pollution-intensiveness, the 
sign of the pre-existent policy instruments, and the pattern of trade 
of both the intermediate and the non-numeraire good. Neverthe-
less, for any of them, the nature of the transmission mechanism is 
the same: spillover effects coming from trade policies may exacer-
bate the pre-existent production externalities through the prices of 
both commodities which affect directly and indirectly the allocation 
of resources and then the sign of the optimal instruments. 
The results presented in this paper provide a theoretical justifi-
cation to propose the design of optimal trade policies linked to en-
vironmental policies in order to ensure that production externalities 
and the spillover effects from trade tariffs are taken into considera-228 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
tion and compensated with adequate policy instruments like pollution 
taxes. Otherwise, the use of second best policies even though theo-
retically supported, does not provide a second best justification for a 
free trade policy in the remainder of the productive sectors, not even 
the intermediate pollutant sector. This analysis could be extended 
to include a variety of instruments for environmental protection and 
study its effects on welfare when interacting with trade policies, then 
comparing which ones best fit according to the externality modelled. 
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Appendix 
Second Best Cases: One Policy Instrument, Three Potential Distor-
tions 
Case 1 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the non-numeraire good t in the presence of all potential distortions, 
with the trade tax on the intermediate input and the pollution tax 
both at a suboptimal level and unalterable, this implies that dr = 
ds = 0. 
In this case (11) then becomes: 
EvdU(l - tCy) = - [t(Rpp - Epp) + rRgp - aRFpA] dt (Al) 
From equation (Al) the first order condition %\Tt? = 0 
* aRpP (EF -8)-T [Rqp + aRFp(l - RqF)\ 
[(RPP - Epp) + aRFp(EpF - RpF)}
 [ ' 
To determine the sign of (A2) assume RFp > 0 and (l-RqF) > 0, 
then t* > or < 0, if r > or < 0, and the magnitude of the marginal 
damage EF, needs to be relatively high, i.e., (Ef > s). 
Case 2 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the trade tax on 
the intermediate input r in the presence of all potential distortions, 
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both at a suboptimal level and unalterable, this implies that dt = 
ds = 0. 
Equation (11) becomes: 
EudUil - tCy) = - [tRpq + rRgq + a(l - RFq)A] dr (A3) 
The first order condition = 0 
* _ {a(l-RFq)(EF-s)+t[Rpq-c,(l-RFq)(EpF-RpF)]} (/,A)  
T ~ [Rqq-a(l-RFq)(l-RqF)] ^> 
The sign of (A4) depends on the sign of the difference between 
the pollution tax and the marginal damage, i.e., (EF - s) > or < 
0, and the sign of the suboptimal and unalterable trade tax on the 
non-numeraire good, i.e., t > or < 0. Suppose RpF > 0 , and 
(1 - RFg) > 0, then the optimal trade tax would be T* > or < 0. 
Case 3 
The domestic small open economy optimally chooses the pollution tax 
on the non-numeraire good s in the presence of all potential distor-
tions, with trade taxes on the non-numeraire good and the interme-
diate input both at a suboptimal level and unalterable, this implies 
that <2£ = dr = 0. 
Equation (11) then becomes: 
EudU{± - tCy) = (A5) 
-a (EF-s- T(1 - RqF) - t(EpF - RpF)) ds 
The first order condition = 0 
s* = EF - r(l - RQF) - t(EpF - RPF) (A6) 
As a result of the suboptimal trade taxes, (A6) shows that the 
optimal pollution tax is different from the optimal Pigouvian tax. 
Suppose RPF > 0, and (1 - RFQ) > 0, then the sign of the opti-
mal pollution tax would depend on the sign of both trade taxes, i.e., 
s* > or < 0, if t > or < 0, and r < or > 0. 